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Let's Hear it for Due Process
-An

Up to Date Primer on Regulatory Takings
E. George Rudolph*

The United States Supreme Court has recently decided three more
cases concerning regulatory takings. The first upheld a state statute requiring that, in the underground mining of coal, some coal be left in place
to protect the surface from subsidence.' The statute was quite similar to
the one struck down in the landmark case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 2which provided the starting point for the law of regulatory takings.
The second determined that a landowner is entitled to compensation for
a temporary taking to the extent that his use of the property has been
restricted by a regulation ultimately found to be invalid.' The third invalidated a regulation requiring that the owner of property along the seacoast grant the public an easement to walk along the shore as a condition
to obtaining a building permit for the property.4 Whether these cases significantly advance or clarify the law in this area seems open to debate,
but one thing is certain. They will substantially increase the anxiety levels of local governing bodies, planners and the attorneys who advise them.
Consideration of the cases requires a somewhat extended review of
history, although the scope of the review undertaken here is quite narrow. The discussion which follows is mostly concerned with decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, but the subject of land use regulation
obviously involves much more than issues of federal constitutional law.
Some preliminary observations may be helpful in setting the stage.
Most land use regulations are enacted by local governing bodies pursuant to state enabling legislation or, perhaps, under the local government's home rule authority. Conditions vary widely from community to
* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law, Laramie, Wyoming.

1. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 11987).
2. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.

2378 (1987).

4. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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community, and it may be expected that regulations will differ in similar
fashion. Clearly the problems are different in a county dependent upon
mining as compared to one devoted to tourism. The problem for the state
legislature, then, is to insure that the enabling legislation is sufficiently
flexible for local governments to deal effectively with their individual
problems. There may, of course, be areas in which statewide uniformity
is desirable, and for these the legislature may either limit the authority
of local governments or enact state regulations. Finally, it is worth noting that the federal government has also become involved in certain areas
of land use regulation.'
Changing conditions, and also changing perceptions of the public
interest, have both increased the need for land use regulations and changed
the regulatory techniques employed. As in other areas, the automobile
may be a principal culprit. Certainly it has made possible a greater dispersion of the population which has blurred the boundaries between urban
and rural areas. The problems have been made more difficult by the
proliferation of second homes in many environmentally sensitive areas.
The end result is that more extensive regulations are needed for the supposed rural areas. But the problems and therefore the solutions are necessarily different from those of urban areas. Put briefly, traditional zoning
does not work well in rural areas or, at least, it works differently. 6
Changes of a different sort have also had a substantial impact. Traditional zoning is apparently based on the assumption that each city lot
will be developed individually, as was largely the case prior to World War
I. For many years, however, residential areas have been developed by
entrepreneurs who construct a substantial number of residential units for
sale in the retail market. This has created difficult problems for local
governments in providing the necessary services, facilities and amenities.
The usual response has been to put the cost on the developer who may
pass it on to his customers, rather than financing the improvements by
local improvement districts or, perhaps, by general obligation bonds. From
a different perspective, however, large scale development makes possible
more innovative and supposedly more desirable community planning. The
result has been planned unit developments and what might be described
as regulation by negotiation.'
5. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985) (involving the federal Clean Water Act); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc.,
452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (involving the federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act). In the VirginiaSurface MiningAss'n case the plaintiffs challenged the federal act as violating the tenth amendment because authority to regulate the use of land has historically been vested in state and local governments. The Court
rejected the argument and sustained the statute under the Commerce Clause. Federal regulation seems most appropriate when economic competition among states precludes effective state and local regulations.
6. See Boundary Drive Assoc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 491 A.2d 86 (Pa. 1985); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 Ill. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981); Rose, FarmlandPreservation Policy and Programs, 24 NAT. REs. J. 591 (1984); Meyers, FarmlandPreservation
in a Democratic Society: Looking to the Future, 3 AGRIc. L.J. 605 (1982).
7. 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, ch. 11 (3rd ed. 1986). As used here the
term, "planned unit development" also includes "cluster developments" and "planned
developments."

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol23/iss2/7

2

Rudolph: Let's Hear It for Due Process - An Up to Date Primer on Regulator

1988

AN Up To DATE PRIMER ON REGULATORY TAKINGS

Traditional zoning regulations largely take the form of general rules
uniformly applicable. If, for example, a landowner has a vacant lot in a
residential zone and desires to construct a convenience store, his options
are limited. He can seek a variance or, failing that, he can request that
the lot be rezoned. Both forms of relief are severely restricted to prevent
discriminatory treatment and to preserve the comprehensive zoning plan.
By way of contrast, many of the more modem regulatory programs, of
which the planned unit development ordinances are the prototype, set a
number of fixed requirements but also include very broad and general standards by which the designated local authority is to judge each proposal
for development. 8 The end result is likely to be a good deal of negotiation
between the developer and the local authority in an effort to enhance the
positive aspects of the proposal and minimize the negatives. Regulations
of this type are not confined to planned unit developments.
For obvious reasons, a more or less substantial body of case law has
developed in each state with respect to these matters. Most of the early
zoning laws were very similar, and the case law of the various states was
likewise similar and almost interchangeable.9 This is changing as each state
and each community attempts to manage its particular and different
problems.
Looming over the entire area is a limited number of United States
Supreme Court decisions setting forth the federal constitutional limits
on land use regulation. When a lawyer with a specific problem turns to
these decisions he will likely experience two difficulties. First, no decision
will be closely on point so far as his particular problem is concerned.
Second, there is a good deal of inconsistency in the decisions, more perhaps
in the opinions than the results. A good deal of intellectual and philosophic
energy has already been expended on the earlier cases by other writers,
and these efforts will not be replicated here. 10 What follows is intended
to be merely descriptive.
THE EARLY CASES

The story begins with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon," decided by
the Supreme Court in 1922. There the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania
statute which required that, in the underground mining of coal, a certain
amount of coal be left in place to protect the surface from subsidence. Even
8. See the standards for judging a proposed planned unit development in Tri-State
Generation and Transmission Co. v. City of Thornton, 647 P.2d 670 (Colo. 1982). These
included, "the design and amenities incorporated in the development plan," "a desirable and
stable environment," and "the creation of a creative innovation and efficient use of the
property." Id See also Michaels Dev. Inc. v. Benzinger Township Bd., 413 A.2d 743 (Pa.
Commw. 1980).
9. State case law has been heavily influenced by the early zoning decisions of the United

States Supreme Court, discussed later.
10. Sax, Takings and the PolicePower, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) [hereinafter Sax I];
Sax,

Takings, PrivatePropertyand Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971), [hereinafter Sax III;
Michelman, Property, Utility,and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just
Compensation"Law,80 HARV. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Rose, Mahon Reconstructed. Why the
Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).
11. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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conceding that the statute served a public interest, it went too far and
therefore constituted a taking without compensation in violation of the
fifth amendment. It went too far because it impacted too greatly upon
the value of the mining company's property interest in the coal. Justice
Holmes wrote for the majority. Justice Brandeis dissented, arguing that
the case should be considered under the due process clause using traditional police power standards, and concluded that when so judged the statute was valid." Various aspects of PennsylvaniaCoal Co. will be considered in greater detail as the discussion progresses, but for now it is
enough to emphasize that the case was decided under the fifth amendment provision which prohibits the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation.
Four years later, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,'" the Court
sustained the sort of zoning now known, fittingly enough, as Euclidian.
The ordinance was challenged on due process grounds, and the Court followed standard police power analysis in considering the issue. Most attention was given to the question of whether zoning serves a public interest,
and the Court concluded that it did because of the new problems then arising from increased urbanization, such as the concentration of population
and increased traffic. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, speculated that if the question had come to the Court fifty years earlier the
'
ordinance would have been struck down as "arbitrary and oppressive." "
Neither the fifth amendment nor the Pennsylvania Coal Co. case was
mentioned in the Village of Euclid opinion. A possible explanation for the
different treatment might be found in the limited issue before the Court
in Village of Euclid Only the general validity of zoning as an exercise of
the police power was considered, the Court expressly reserving for later
determination the validity of a particular zoning classification upon a
specific property. There was evidence that the zoning reduced the value
of plaintiff's property by 75%, but he had not sought a variance."
The reserved question came to the Court in Nectow v. City of Cambridge 6 decided in 1928. The zoning ordinance, as applied, made the plaintiff's property useless, and the Court invalidated it under the due process
clause as an improper exercise of the police power. The stated basis for
the decision was that the ordinance, as applied to plaintiff's land, did not
serve the public interest. In reaching its decision, the Court examined the
zoning map and concluded that the zoning plan would be as well served
by zoning the particular property industrial rather than residential." The
zoning ordinance, as a whole, remained in placeJustice Sutherland in Village of Euclid and Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in Pennsylvania Coal Co. both relied upon Hadacheck v. Sebas12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id at 422.
272 U.S. 365 1926).
Id. at 387.
Id at 384-86.
277 U.S. 183 (1928).
Id. at 188.
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tian,"I decided in 1915. In that case, the Court sustained an ordinance prohibiting the operation of brickyards in a specifically described area even
though the effect, according to petitioner, was to reduce the value of his
property from $800,000 to $60,000. Apart from the reduction in value,
the case is noteworthy in three respects. First, the Court relied mostly
upon the decision of the California Supreme Court which it affirmed.
Second, the Court considered it more or less immaterial that the brickyard was in operation for a substantial period before the residential
development of the area began and before the ordinance was adopted. With
respect to the police power, the Court said, "A vested interest cannot be
considered against it because of conditions once obtaining."' 9 Third, the
Court refused to consider whether a less harsh regulation would be sufficient for the purpose, stating that such questions were for the legislative
body. Finally, it may be noted that petitioner based his2 0case upon the equal
protection clause as well as the due process clause.
Contemporaneously with the Village of Euclid and Nectow cases, the
Court decided a third zoning case which did not concern reductions in value
2
as a major issue but is significant in other respects. In Gorieb u. Fox '
the Court sustained, when challenged on due process and equal protection grounds, a rather freefloating regulation governing the distance buildings must be set back from the streets. The ordinance first provided a
general rule based upon the distance of existing buildings from the street,
but then reserved to the city council the authority to negotiate exceptions
in particular cases. The principal complaint was vagueness because of a
lack of standards. The Court concluded that on the facts petitioner had
not been injured by this, and that, as a general proposition, the provision
was appropriate because local governments need flexibility in dealing with
newly emerging and unanticipated problems. The Court emphasized the
deference that should be accorded to state and local governing bodies in
dealing with local problems, and explicitly stated that deference should
also be accorded to the decisions of state courts because of their "greater
familiarity with local concerns.' '22
Discussion now returns to the problem presented by the entirely different standards applied in PennsylvaniaCoal Co. and the early zoning cases.
Certainly the difference cannot be explained in terms of the relative impact
upon property values resulting from the different types of regulations.
But an explanation might be found in the rather elusive doctrine of "average reciprocity of advantage." Apparently, the idea is that a class of persons burdened by a legislative act may also be benefited by it, and the
latter will serve as a sort of substitute for the compensation mandated
by the fifth amendment notwithstanding that some individuals may be
18. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
19. Id. at 410.

20. Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) is a better equal protection case. There the
Court, with difficulty, sustained a statute setting lower height limits for buildings in residential
areas than those permitted in commercial areas. Id at 103.
21. 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
22. Id at 609.
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more burdened than benefited. Justice Holmes coined the phrase in Pennsylvania Coal Co., 2S without further elaboration or citation of authority,
to distinguish an earlier decision sustaining a Pennsylvania statute requiring that some coal be left in place for the safety of miners in adjoining
mines. In his dissent, Justice Brandeis did cite a number of cases and concluded that the doctrine should not be applied with respect to the police
power but only in cases where the legislation in question confers a benefit
upon some property owners at the expense of others. If the doctrine were
applicable, he found that it was satisfied because the coal company had4
"the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community."1
This, of course, would be applicable to any police power regulation, but
zoning probably meets a more restrictive reading of the requirement.
Whatever the merits of the average reciprocity of advantage doctrine,
it was ignored in another well known case decided at about the same time
as the zoning cases. In Miller v. Schoene2 ' the Court sustained a Virginia
statute requiring the destruction of cedar trees which threatened nearby
apple orchards with cedar rust, a disease fatal to apple trees. Again the
question was whether this was a proper exercise of the police power when
judged under the due process clause. The Court noted that the only question was which of two groups should bear an inevitable loss and concluded
that the legislature could properly direct that it fall on the owners of the
cedar trees because of the importance of the apple business to the economy of the state.2 6 In other words, the statute was a proper exercise of
the police power because it served the public interest as determined by
the legislature. Clearly the cedar tree owners, as a class, received no
reciprocal advantage.
Another possible explanation for the different analysis followed in
PennsylvaniaCoal Co., when compared to the other cases, might be found
in the historical development of a broader constitutional doctrine. Justice
Holmes may have been more innovative than his colleagues, or at least
ahead of the times.
In Fallbrook IrrigationDistrictv. Bradley,2 decided in 1896, the Court
noted that the taking without compensation clause of the fifth amendment applies only to the federal government and therefore is not available in considering the constitutionality of a state statute. For purposes
of the case before it, the Court was left, therefore, with only the due process
clause, but the result it reached was much the same as that reached by
state courts in similar cases decided under state constitutional provisions
comparable to the fifth amendment taking provision. 8 The following year,
23. 260 U.S. at 415.
24. Id at 422.

25. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
26. Id. at 277-81. See Sax I, supra note 10, at 69.
27. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
28. The state cases, like Fallbrook, concerned the validity of special assessments levied
by a local improvement district. See People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec.
266 (1851); McGarvey v. Swan, 17 Wyo. 120, 96 P. 697 (1908); Willard v. Morton, 50 Wyo.
72. 59 P.2d 338 (1936).
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in Chicago B & Q R.R. v. City of Chicago,9 the Court did incorporate the
taking without compensation prohibition into the fourteenth amendment
but without reference to the fifth amendment. Instead the Court determined that, "It is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by jurists
' 0
as a principle of universal law. "3
Justice Holmes was not burdened by similar inhibitions when he wrote
for the Court in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 31 decided in 1911. The bank
challenged on due process grounds a state statute requiring it to contribute to a depositors' guaranty fund. The verbal sleight-of-hand by which
the due process and taking without compensation provisions of the constitution were brought together is worth quoting.
[W]e must be cautious about pressing the broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment to a drily logical extreme. Many laws ...could

be shown, easily enough, to transgress a scholastic interpretation
of one or another of the great guaranties in the Bill of Rights.
The substance of the plaintiff's argument is that the assessment
32
takes private property for private use with out compensation.
Mission accomplished! The two provisions had been joined and the
fifth amendment made applicable to the states by the fourteenth. Plaintiff's argument was rejected, however, because the case was one "in which
the share of each party in the benefit of a scheme of mutual protection
is sufficient compensation for the correlative burden that it is compelled
to assume."Is The statute was sustained as a proper exercise of the police
power.
In the Pennsylvania Coal Co. case, Justice Holmes stated that the
taking rule of the fifth amendment could be applied under the fourteenth
amendment,8 ' but did not cite the Noble Bank case for either the interrelation of the two or for the average reciprocity of advantage." In any event,
the use of the fourteenth amendment to make various provisions of the
federal Bill of Rights applicable to the states is now commonplace, but
when the early zoning cases were decided this was not so well settled and
that might explain the Court's reliance upon substantive due process. On
the other hand, the Court had no difficulty in reading the taking without
compensation limitation into the fourteenth amendment in the Chicago
B & Q R.R case which involved a regular eminent domain proceeding
rather than a so-called regulatory taking.
29. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
30. Id. at 236.
31. 219 U.S. 104 (1911).

32. 1& at 110 (It should be noted that the bank's principal argument was that its
property was being taken for a private rather than a public use as mandated by the fifth
amendment.).
33. Id. at 111.
34. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
35. For the incorporation of the taking without compensation limitation into the fourteenth amendment, he cited Hairston v. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908), which,
ironically, relied upon FalbrookIrrigationDist., 164 U.S. 112 (1896) discussed in text at note
27.
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Finally, in Goldblatt v.Town of Hempstead,36 decided in 1962, the
police power analysis and the taking without compensation analysis came
together. There the Court sustained a regulation which, as applied, prohibited the further mining of gravel from an operating gravel pit. In other
respects too, the facts were similar to those of the Hadacheck case. The
Court rather summarily disposed of the taking without compensation
argument based on Pennsylvania Coal Co. because there was not sufficient evidence in the record to determine the reduction in value resulting
from the regulation. It did note the diminution in value upheld in the
Hadacheck case and concluded, "we find no indication that the prohibitory effect of Ordinance No. 16 is sufficient to render it an unconstitutional taking if it is otherwise a valid police regulation."3 7This was immediately followed by the statement, "The question, therefore, narrows to
whether the prohibition of further excavation below the water table is a
valid exercise of the town's police power."' 8 The Court was now on more
comfortable ground, and the bulk of the opinion is devoted to that
question.
At this point, it would appear that PennsylvaniaCoal Co. might well
have been viewed as an aberration that could properly be ignored, and
that might have happened if the opinion had been written by a different
justice.39 But Justice Holmes painted with a broad brush and was not
overly concerned with the legal niceties. As a result the opinion is very
readable, and this may explain its pervasive influence in the more recent
decisions. In any event, the later history took a different course.
PENN CENTRAL AND AGINS

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.New York City,40 decided in
1978, the Court sustained the city's landmark preservation ordinance as
applied to Grand Central Terminal, even though it substantially limited,
or prohibited, the construction of an office tower above the station. The
tower would have significantly increased Penn Central's income from the
property. Under the ordinance, any plan to alter the exterior of a building designated as an historic landmark had to be approved by the Landmarks Preservation Commission. After the Commission rejected a plan
for a fifty story office tower, Penn Central chose not to submit a further
plan for a less obtrusive structure and, instead, brought suit.
In his opinion, Justice Brennan substantially rewrote history. The only
issue, as he viewed the case, was whether the application of the ordinance
to Grand Central constituted an impermissible taking under the fifth
36. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
37. Id at 594.
38. Id.
39. There are of course, many state and lower federal court cases in which the taking
analysis has been considered. Prominent examples are Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.
2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), and Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891
(Mass. 1972) (involving wetland and flood plain zoning). See also Responsible Citizens v. City
of Asheville, 302 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. 1983).
40. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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amendment. He discussed most of the cases noted above, but the discussion more or less assumed that the issue involved was whether the particular regulation resulted in a taking without compensation. Apart from
Pennsylvania Coal Co., this possibility was addressed only in Goldblatt
v. Hempstead Justice Brennan's treatment of Goldblattis especially interesting because he studiously avoided any mention of substantive due
process and the police power. One sentence deserves quoting: "It is, of
course, implicit in Goldblatt that a use restriction on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
" As
substantial public purpose, see Nectow v. Cambridge,supra; ... ".
verbal sleight-of-hand this rivals Justice Holmes' opinion in Noble State
Bank.
Most of the opinion in Penn Central is devoted to the question of
whether the designation of Grand Central Terminal as a historic site, with
the resulting use restrictions, goes too far under the rule of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. At the outset Justice Brennan distinguished so-called regulatory
takings from the exercise of eminent domain to acquire property for city
facilities or "entrepreneurial operations." He also distinguished the inverse
condemnation cases such as United States v. Causby,42 which have
awarded compensation under the fifth amendment when the otherwise
unrelated activities of a governmental entity inflict damage to a landowners property."3 The latter are sometimes referred to as "physical invasions" to distinguish them from regulatory takings, and this is helpful,
but then confusion is introduced once more by lumping both under the
heading, "inverse condemnation." Those distinctions having been noted,
Justice Brennan stated the rule for regulatory takings as follows: "a state
statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking'.

44

Putting the two limitations together, a regulation that does not serve
the public interest is an impermissible taking, but even a regulation that
does so serve may be a taking if it significantly frustrates investment
backed expectations. Two questions remain. Under what circumstances
will a regulation constitute a taking if it goes too far? On this, the Court
noted that in a number of the earlier cases, including Hadacheck and Goldblatt, the Court sustained regulations that prohibited the continuation
of an existing use.
The second question concerns the meaning of "investment backed
expectations." On the facts of the case, it apparently meant that Penn
Central had acquired the property in its present form for its present use,
and the cost did not include any additional amount for the possibility that
41. Id at 127.
42. 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (The leading airport noise case.).
43. For an early case, see Pumpely v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).

A dam, constructed pursuant to state law, caused flooding of plaintiff's land. The case was
decided under the state constitution. Id at 177, 181.
44. 438 U.S. at 127.
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it might become economically desirable at some future time to build an
office tower above it. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent took the position
that Penn Central had a constitutionally protected right to develop the
air space over Grand Central, never mind that it came as a financial windfall.
The New York Court of Appeals gave the latter question a good deal
of attention in its opinion in the Penn Central case, beginning with the
statement:
Undisputed is the principle, rooted in the due process clause of
the Constitution, that a government may not by regulation deprive
a property owner of all reasonable return on his property. There
are two issues nevertheless. The first is the extent to which government, when regulating private property, must assure a reasonable return on that ingredient of property value created not so much
by the efforts of the property owner, but instead by the accumulated indirect social and direct governmental investment in the
physical property, its functions, and its surroundings.""
It was the growth and development of the area around Grand Central Terminal, for which society at large and also government were mostly
responsible, that made it economically desirable to construct the office
tower. The New York court concluded that Penn Central had a constitutionally protected right to only "a reasonable return on the privately contributed ingredient of the property's value."' 6
This is probably what Justice Brennan had in mind when he coined
the phrase, "investment backed expectations," and it works well enough
in a situation like Penn Central But further difficulties are presented by
cases where the developer has recently purchased the property, and the
long term appreciation in value has thereby been realized by his grantor
before the developer comes forward with his plan. In any event, the rule
as it emerges from Justice Brennan's opinion is somewhat different. A
regulation restricting or prohibiting further development is permissible
if the landowner can realize a reasonable return from the property in its
present form. For this purpose the property as a whole must be considered. It is not appropriate to concentrate only on a specific part-in this
case, the right to develop the air space above Grand Central.
The determination of this issue on the particular facts was more complex because the right to develop the air space over Grand Central, apparently provided by different regulations, could be transferred to other
nearby property owned by Penn Central. The Court concluded that this
would not constitute just compensation for purposes of the fifth amendment, but that it was relevant in determining if the regulation went too far.
Justice Rehnquist raised a further issue in his dissent. The problem
lay in distinguishing the restrictions imposed upon the Grand Central
45. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271,

1272-73 (1977).
46. Id, 366 N.E.2d at 1276.
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property under the landmark preservation ordinance from the height limitations commonly found in zoning ordinances. For this, he resurrected
the average reciprocity of advantage. In the case of zoning, "the burden
is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude that on the
whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be
benefited by another."47 By way of contrast, Penn Central was being
required to bear the entire financial burden of securing a public benefit
for which, in fairness, the public should pay. In actions directed against
specific property, Justice Rehnquist would limit a government's regulatory authority to cases involving common law nuisances.
Justice Brennan had some difficulty with this. He noted that in a number of the earlier cases, Hadacheck, Goldblatt and Miller v. Schoene, the
property owners were "uniquely burdened" and obviously received no offsetting benefit.' All of these however, could be brought into the nuisance
category as they were by Justice Rehnquist. Apparently realizing this,
Justice Brennan found in the program to preserve historic sites, although
it was directed to widely scattered individual properties, a comprehensive plan somewhat similar to the comprehensive plan required for zoning.
The New York Court of Appeals did not have similar difficulties with
this question. There were obvious reasons for singling out the Grand Central property for special treatment, and the case, therefore, did not fall
into the category of "discriminatory zoning" or spot zoning. The vice in
such cases is that a particular property is arbitrarily subjected to more
restrictive or more liberal limitations than similar property in the same
area which cannot be distinguished. In other words, the only question is
whether the special treatment reasonably serves the public interest.
The next case, Agins v. City of Tburon,4 4 decided two years after Penn
Central,will be considered in some detail on a different issue, but it added
very little with respect to the proper standards for judging the validity
of a land use regulation. In a short opinion, Justice Powell paraphrased
Penn Centralby stating, "The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests. .. ."" This was followed by the observation that, "the question necessarily requires a weighing of private and
public interests. "51 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co." served as the
primary authority for the latter proposition.
Agins is more interesting on its particular facts as they relate to the
question of whether the regulation went too far. The land was included
in a particularly restrictive zoning category, designed primarily to protect open space and scenic values. The ordinance set maximum and mini47. Penn Central 438 U.S. at 147.
48. Id at 133.
49. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

50. Id at 260.

51. Id at 261.
52. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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mum limitations on density and required that individual development
plans be submitted for approval. Plaintiffs were entitled to construct at
least one residence on their tract and might be allowed as many as five,
but they did not seek a permit before challenging the regulation. Therefore, the Court concluded that they remained free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations and could not yet challenge the regulation
as applied to their particular property." Apparently the Court was somewhat concerned with the individualized treatment of specific tracts
because it noted that, "There is no indication that the appellants' 5-acre
tract is the only property affected by the ordinances. Appellants therefore will share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the city's
exercise of its police power. " 4 In other words, there is an average
reciprocity of advantage. 5
Penn Central and Agins obviously changed and refined the law in an
abstract sense, but from a practical point of view the changes would not
seem significant. The standards for judging police power regulations were
moved from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
fifth amendment taking provision but apparently remained unchanged
otherwise. This conclusion is amply supported by the Court's continued
reliance upon the earlier zoning cases.
The rule of Pennsylvania Coal Co., that a regulation which goes too
far constitutes an impermissible taking, was now firmly established as
a separate limitation in addition to the traditional police power standards.
Under the rule as further refined by Penn Centra4 the real question is
whether the landowner can realize a reasonable return from the property
once the regulation is in place, and this is to be determined on the basis
of the landowner's entire interest in the property rather than the discrete
lesser interest impacted by the regulation. State courts have frequently
reached the same result under the due process clause. A zoning regulation will be invalid as applied to particular property if it renders the
property useless.16 At this point the regulation no longer serves the public interest. In other cases, the police power analysis calls for weighing
the importance of the public interest against the regulation's impact upon
the value of the property, as Justice Powell noted, and thus provides a
more refined test.5" Pennsylvania Coal Co. would thus appear, at worst,
to be an unnecessary fifth wheel.
Penn Central and Agins illustrate a further aspect of regulatory taking litigation that has been decisive in other recent cases. Before it can
53. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63.
54. Id. at 262.
55. Compare American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.
1981) (the court noted that the particular zoning classification applied only to the tract in

question).
56. Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); State ex
reL George v. Hull, 65 Wyo. 251, 199 P.2d 832 (1948). R. ANDERSON, supranote 7, at § 3.27.
Nectow v. Village of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) is, of course, most often cited.
57. Davis v. City of Rockford, 60 It App.2d 325, 208 N.E.2d 110 (1965). See Macfarlane,
Testing the ConstitutionalValidity of Land Use Regulations:Substantive Due Process as
a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 715 (1982).
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be determined if a regulation goes too far, the landowner must pursue the
available administrative procedures to determine precisely what he can
do with the property. In this respect the cases are similar to Village of
Euclid A regulation will be invalid on its face only if it fails to serve the
public interest. As Justice White stated in Riverside Bayview Homes, "the
mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body, does
not constitute a regulatory taking."los
Local governing bodies and administrators could, at this point, also
take comfort from the box score. The challenged regulations were sustained in Penn Central and Agins and also in the earlier cases, discussed
above, except for PennsylvaniaCoal Co. and Nectow v. City of Cambridge.
Further evidence that the Supreme Court did not pose a serious threat
might be found in the Court's reluctance to become involved in the controversy over zoning regulations which operate to exclude low income persons from developing suburban areas. These cases were decided contemporaneously with Penn Central and Agins.'9
On the other hand two new areas of uncertainty were created by Penn
Central.The first involves the full meaning in various circumstances of
the phrase, "investment backed expectations." The second concerns the
extent to which different standards should be used in judging regulatory
specifications tailor-made for a particular property. While regulations of
this sort were sustained in both Penn Central and Agins, the distinction
between such regulations and those more broadly applicable appeared to
play a significant role in the Rehnquist dissent and caused at least passing difficulty for the Court in Agins.
KEYSTONE BITUMINOUS COAL Ass'N v. DE BENEDICTUS

In Keystone Bituminous CoalAssn, 0 the first of the 1987 cases, the
Court upheld a 1966 Pennsylvania statute requiring that substantial
amounts of coal be left in place when mining under public buildings, noncommercial buildings used by the public such as churches, and dwellings,
streams and reservoirs. The problem for Justice Stevens, who wrote for
the majority, was to reconcile the holding with Pennsylvania Coal Co.
which had struck down a similar statute and provided the starting point
for the taking without compensation limitation upon land use regulations.
For this, Justice Stevens resorted to the balancing test, long a part of
the police power standards under the due process clause-and incorporated
into the regulatory taking analysis by Agins. The 1966 statute served
58. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (19851. See also Hodel
v. Surface Min.& Reclam. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
For a recent application of the rule, see Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis
Obispo, 830 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1987).
59. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See also Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121,
which sustained federal regulations governing the filling of wetlands adopted under the Clean
Water Act.
60. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
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a broader and more important public interest than the earlier statute
before the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. Judging solely from the opinions, this would appear to be correct.6'
Justice Holmes was inclined to view the dispute in PennsylvaniaCoal
Co. as primarily between the owner of the surface and the coal company
which owned the mineral estate. From this perspective, the surface owner
was not an appealing litigant because his title traced to a conveyance from
the coal company which expressly reserved the right to mine the coal
without liability to the surface owner for any resulting subsidence. A somewhat broader public interest was recognized where, in other instances,
coal might be mined "under streets and cities." The discussion which followed dealt solely with public streets and ended by putting the governmental entities owning the streets into the same category as other surface owners.
Obviously Justice Holmes did weigh the importance of the public
interest against the regulation's impact upon the landowner's use of the
property. All of the subsequent difficulties, including the tunnel vision
analysis required in applying the "goes too far" limitation, may be traced
to one or the other of two sentences in the Holmes opinion:
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.... We are in danger of forgetting that a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change. 2
Clearly there is more to the opinion than that. Some writers have suggested that Justice Holmes employed the taking analysis because of a
strong aversion to substantive due process expressed in an earlier dissent.63
The Pennsylvania legislature was aware of the problem when it
enacted the 1966 statute before the Court in Keystone. The statute
included a preamble setting forth the public purposes to be served. These
included, among others, "the conservation of surface land areas which may
be affected in the mining of bituminous coal .... to enhance the value
of such lands for taxation, to aid in the preservation of surface water
drainage and public water supplies and generally to improve the use and
enjoyment of such lands .... ,
61. Id at 1242. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist went to the state court opinion in
PennsylvaniaCoal Co. to find that the statute under consideration in that case was intended
to serve a broader public interest than recognized by Justice Holmes. Id at 1255-56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415-16.
63. Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction
Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193, 209 J1984).
64. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242 (quoting from the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act).
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Therefore according to the Court, there was no real conflict or inconsistency in the decisions. The public interest to be served by the police
power had simply changed and expanded over time. Which brings to mind
Justice Sutherland's statement in Village of Euclid "And in this there
is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of the constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract
to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming
within the field of their operation.""
Keystone is noteworthy in another respect. The preamble to the statute, quoted above, can be further edited to leave, as the public purposes
to be served, "the conservation of surface land areas which may be affected
in the mining of bituminous coal ...and generally to improve the use
and enjoyment of such lands." The question suggested is this: How far
may the legislature go in prohibiting a landowner from despoiling his own
land without reference to the effect of his actions upon his neighbors or
even upon the public at large, when the public is viewed as an indeterminate number of outsiders with an immediate interest at stake? For
example, in Penn Central the public did have an immediate and direct
interest in viewing the historic building. In some cases the conflict is
between present and future generations. This may be the new frontier in
land use regulations." The Pennsylvania legislature did, of course, hedge
its bet by including among the purposes of the statute the protection of
the tax base, surface water drainage and public water supplies.
Justice Stevens still had to deal with the separate question of whether
the regulation went too far. Applying the test set forth in Penn Central,
he concluded that it did not. The amount of coal required to be left in place
was a very small fraction of the coal available for mining. Beyond that,
there was no evidence that any mining operations had been made uneconomic by the statute. It may be worth noting that this treatment of the
issue follows quite closely the dissent of Justice Brandeis in Pennsylvania Coal Co. In the course of an extended consideration of the question,
he stated, "If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by
the restriction, we should compare it with the value of all other parts of
rights in the parts can not be greater than
the land.... The sum of the
7
the rights in the whole."6

Justice Rehnquist dissented with an opinion which was largely a replay
of his dissent in Penn Central Again he took the position that a regulation which burdens a landowner or class of landowners with no offsetting
potential benefit can be sustained only if the forbidden use is illegal or
a common law nuisance." This goes beyond his dissent in Penn Central,
which involved regulatory limitations directed to a particular property.
65. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
66. Cribbet, Propertyin the Twenty-First Century, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1978). The
federal Surface Mining and Control Act of 1977 provides a good example. See Hodel v. Surface Min.& Reclam. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981). See
generally A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, (1947); Sax II, supra note 10.
67. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 419.
68. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1256.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1988

15

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 23 [1988], Iss. 2, Art. 7
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol, XXIII

It also seems contrary to one of the basic assumptions underlying zoning. A regulation which only prohibits a change in use or restricts future
uses is a proper exercise of the police power if it serves the public interest.
The nuisance limitation is appropriate only when the regulation prohibits
the continuation of an existing use.69 At this point, the Rehnquist position seems to rely entirely upon the supposed requirement for an average
reciprocity of advantage. The position of the majority on this requirement
is also reminiscent of the Brandeis dissent which, as noted above, found
a sufficient reciprocity of advantage from the fact that the coal company
had "the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community."" Justice Stevens stated it this way:
Under our system of government, one of the state's primary ways
of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals
can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the
restrictions that are placed on others .... These restrictions are
"properly treated as part of the burden of common citizenship."
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).7
On the question of whether the regulation went too far, Justice
Rehnquist considered only the value of the coal required to be left in place
without reference to its relative value when compared to the whole. For
this he relied upon the measure of recovery in regular eminent domain
proceedings and also inverse condemnation actions involving physical
invasions such as the airport noise cases. Three other justices joined the
dissent, and this was an increase of one over Penn Central72Remarkably,
Justice Stevens was one of the dissenters in Penn Centralbut then wrote
for the majority in Keystone.
FIRST ENGLISH EVAN. LUTH. CHURCH V.

Los

ANGELES COUNTY
73

In the second 1987 case, FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church,
the Court held that a landowner could recover compensation for a temporary taking during the period that his use of the property was inhibited
by a regulation ultimately determined to be invalid. Given the short history of the question, the result was not surprising. A broader historical
perspective might suggest that it is an illegitimate offspring of the mismating of the police power and the fifth amendment.
The question of whether compensation may be recovered for a regulatory taking first gained prominence with the California Supreme Court's
1979 decision in Agins v. City of Tiburon.14 The issue was decided by an
extended dictum which began by characterizing the suit as one for inverse

69. Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930). R. ANDERSON, supra note 7,
at § 6.06 (on non-conforming uses).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 422.
Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1245.
See Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 106.
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
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condemnation under the fifth amendment, and then struggled with the
problem before concluding that the only relief available to the aggrieved
landowner was a determination that the regulation was invalid and unenforceable. The court was mostly concerned with the unanticipated fiscal
impact that a monetary recovery would have upon a local government.
The prospect of such liability would make local governments overly timid
in dealing with newly arising problems and new perceptions of the public
interest. For this, the court relied on Village of Euclid. It did put forward
a somewhat different analysis of the relationship of the police power to
the fifth amendment. Taking some liberty with the court's statement, it
comes to this: If the regulation is invalid as an exercise of the police power,
it cannot be sustained as a taking for a public purpose because compensation is not paid. When the Agins case reached the United States
Supreme Court, it affirmed the California court's determination that the
regulation was valid, as discussed above, and therefore did not reach the
compensation question."

It may be noted at this point that the New York Court of Appeals
in Penn Centraldisposed of the claim for compensation with a single sentence: "Of course, any so-called temporary 'taking' is more accurately
described as a deprivation of property without due process of law.' '6 This
contrasts sharply with the difficulties experienced by the California court
in dealing with the issue under the fifth amendment taking provision.

The next case to reach the United States Supreme Court, San Diego
Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego," concerned land in a coastal
drainage area which the city had designated as open space and sought
to purchase. This failed, however, because the voters refused to authorize a bond issue. At this point, the company sued for compensation alleging that the city's action had made the property valueless. The California Court of Appeals considered only the compensation question and did
not decide if there had, on the facts, been a taking. Therefore the Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal because the state court had not rendered a
final judgment. Justice Brennan dissented and, reaching the substantive
issue, concluded that compensation should be awarded.
For Justice Brennan, the most difficult question involved the extent
of the taking. The plaintiff contended that, once the regulation became
effective, its property had been permanently taken, apparently on the
assumption that the regulation would continue in force. However, Justice
Brennan noted that the city might elect to repeal or amend the regulation, and in that case the taking would be only temporary. This is confusing. The more likely sequence would be for a court to invalidate the regu75. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
76. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
1274 (1977). See also Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984).
In a case subsequent to First English Evan. Luth. Church, Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. Midtown North, 257 Ga. 496, 360 S.E.2d 569 (1987), the court restated its earlier
rule, that zoning which is a proper exercise of the police power does not constitute a taking,
declaring that it had not been changed.
77. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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lation in the same proceedings in which the landowner sought compensation. At that point, the city could resort to eminent domain to keep the
regulation in force. Justice Brennan should not be blamed for the confusion. In a 1976 decision, a California appellate court sustained an open
space zoning ordinance as a proper exercise of the police power, and then
stated that the landowner might be awarded compensation for a fifth
amendment taking, relying on Pennsylvania Coal Co."h
Three other justices joined the dissent in San Diego Gas and Electric,79 and Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion indicated that he
would agree if the issue were properly before the Court. Thereafter a number of courts, both state and federal, considered the issue settled.80
The Supreme Court itself had greater difficulties. In two subsequent
cases the Court was unable to reach the question of compensation because
the landowner, once his original application for a permit was denied, chose
to litigate rather than pursue the available administrative procedures that
might allow him to go forward with a less desirable but still economically
viable development.81 In this respect the cases are somewhat reminiscent
of Agins, Penn Centraland Village of Euclid, in which the Court only sustained the regulations generally and not as ultimately applied.
Some of the Justices were apparently becoming impatient, and as
noted above, the question was decided in First English Evan. Luth.
Church. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was based largely on Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas and Electric and was relatively short. By
then little remained unsaid.82 He did clear up the confusion by recognizing that the temporary taking might end with a judicial decision invalidating the regulation. One statement deserves special mention: "We limit
our holding to the facts presented, and of course do not deal with the quite
different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes
in zoning ordinances, variances and the like
8'
which are not before us."
78. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976). Compare United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (involving compensation for taking by federal regulationsi. In Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, 450 So.
2d 213 (Fla. 1984), the Florida court stated that zoning cannot be both reasonable and confiscatory.
79. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 633, 636 (1981).
80. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983); Burrows v. City of Keene,
121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981); Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141
(9th Cir. 1983); Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985).
81. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, (1986) reh'g denied
107 S. Ct. 22 (1986); Williamson County Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985). In the latter case the landowner brought suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982), and the Court held that he must first seek compensation under state inverse condemnation law. For an application of this requirement, see Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes,
816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987).
82. Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babock, The White River JunctionManifesto,
9 VT. L. REv.193 11984); Scharf, Inverse Condemnation:Its Availability in Challengingthe
Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1439 (1974).
83. FirstEnglish Evan. Luth. Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
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Justice Stevens dissented. He would allow the landowner to recover
damages only in cases involving "improperly motivated, unfairly conducted or unnecessarily protracted governmental decision making."14 In
such cases recovery would be based upon the due process clause rather
than the taking provision of the fifth amendment. On this, he drew a distinction between regulatory takings and inverse condemnation actions
involving physical invasions.
As Justice Stevens noted, many questions remain unanswered. Is
there a taking for which compensation is required when a variance or special exception is denied by the appropriate local authority, or must the
denial also be affirmed by the courts? The question will necessarily be
different in cases like Agins and Penn Central where the regulation contemplates a good deal of individual negotiation, and even more difficult
when several governmental agencies are involved. 8 This whole area has
considerable potential for confusion. The landowner must pursue the
administrative procedures to the end before it can be determined if the
regulation goes too far. The point at which the time consumed in this constitutes a temporary taking is apparently a separate question. Justice
Stevens suggested a further problem. Even though the impact of a particular regulation upon the property's value might be so severe as to constitute a taking if the regulation remained in force, the landowner's loss
may not rise to the level of a compensable taking when the regulation is
only in effect for a limited period before being invalidated or repealed. This
suggests another question. Once it is determined that there has been a
taking, does it begin when the regulation becomes effective or only when
a permit is first denied?
There would appear to be a further limitation. While it may be
appropriate to award compensation when a regulation is judged a taking
because it goes too far, the remedy should not be available when the impact
of the regulation is determined to be a taking because it does not "substantially advance legitimate state interests." To award compensation
in such cases would turn accepted eminent domain law on its head. In
a regular condemnation proceeding, the first question is whether the taking is for a public use, or at least serves a public purpose. 86 If the answer
is no, that ends the matter, and the question of just compensation is never
reached. The landowner may be entitled to damages for the loss he has
experienced because of the proceedings, but this is more akin to the alternative remedy proposed by Justice Stevens. This distinction was recognized by Justice Brennan in his dissent in San Diego Gas and Electric.
84. Id at 2399. See also Justice Stevens, concurring in Williamson County Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), in which he characterized temporary regulatory takings as "an inevitable cost of doing business in a highly regulated society." Id at
204 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. See for example, The Wyoming Industrial Development and Information Siting Act,
WYo. STAT. §§ 35-12-101 to -119 (1977 & Supp. 1987).
86. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hairston v. Danville & W. R. Co., 208 U.S.

598 (1908).
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At best, the Court in FirstEnglish Evan. Luth. Church did not show
great sensitivity to the budgetary problems of local governments." Will
a liability of this sort be covered by a municipality's present insurance?
If not, is such insurance available? In any event, local governments are
currently experiencing difficulties in obtaining insurance at affordable
premiums. In a different area, municipal liability for anti-trust violations,
Congress came to the rescue by eliminating damage recoveries against
local governments." This sort of relief is not possible for regulatory taking cases because these are based upon the fourteenth and fifth amendments to the Constitution.
NOLLAN

V. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N

Of the three recent cases, Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission"
is the most controversial and has the most serious implications. The Court
struck down a regulation requiring the owner of a lot along the sea coast
to grant the public an easement to walk along the shore as a condition
to obtaining a permit to construct a house on the lot. The regulation had
been adopted by the Commission in accordance with a state statute
enacted to ensure continued public access to the sea.
No question was presented as to whether the regulation went too far,
nor was there any question that the purpose to be served was a proper
public purpose. Rather the question was whether the regulation met the
second requirement for a valid exercise of the police power. Was it a
reasonably appropriate means for accomplishing the purpose? Traditionally the courts have accorded a good deal of deference to the legislative
judgment on this issue. The question of means is basically a legislative
one, and the scope of judicial review is limited by the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.9
The Court, however, began its consideration of the question by quoting the proposition, stated in Agins and derived from Penn Central that
a regulation is a taking in violation of the fifth amendment if it "does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests."91 Read literally, this
leaves no room for deference to the legislative judgment. The reviewing
court will make its own decision as to whether the regulation is appropriate based on the facts of the case. Borrowing from the equal protection
cases, this might be characterized as "heightened scrutiny." However,
subJustice Scalia said that for purposes of this new standard neither
92
stantive due process nor equal protection cases are relevant.
87. Compare Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), with his dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985) (Garciaoverruled National League of Cities).
88. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. IV 1986).

89. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
90. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); State v. W.S. Buck Merc. Co.. 38 Wyo.

47, 264 P. 1023 (1928).

91. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
92. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S.Ct. at 3147 n.3.
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There is something ironic in this. The case which supposedly prompted
Justice Holmes to divorce himself from substantive due process, Lochner v. New York, 9' struck down a New York statute setting a maximum
work week of sixty hours for bakery employees. In his dissent, Justice
Holmes criticized the judicial activism then prevailing as the Court struck
down numerous state regulatory statutes while sustaining others that
were difficult to distinguish. He suggested that the Court was simply
applying its own economic views contrary to those of the elected legislative bodies. California Coastal Commission demonstrates that the fifth
amendment taking provision is at least as good a vehicle for judicial activism as the due process clause.
For Justice Brennan, the chickens had come home to roost. In a long
dissent he disclaimed responsibility for the new standard of review set
out in CaliforniaCoastalCommission. He now had no reluctance to speak
of the police power and quoted at length from one of the early zoning cases,
Gorieb v. Fox, " for the deference to be accorded state and local legislatures in their efforts to deal with newly arising land use problems. Unfortunately he did not refer to the later statements in the Gorieb opinion
concerning the deference to be accorded state court decisions.
Justice Scalia was well advised to distinguish the equal protection
cases. It would be difficult to characterize the owners of residential
property along the coast as victims of an invidious or suspect classification. In City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center,9" the Court
declined to apply heightened scrutiny on behalf of the mentally retarded.
For this, it relied on the large body of federal and state statutes designed
to protect and advance the rights of the mentally retarded. In some cases
it is appropriate to rely, within limits, upon the legislative branch to protect constitutional rights.K Certainly landowners and developers can be
expected to present their views fully and forcefully to the relevant legislative body.
The Court did provide some justification for the new standard of
review. The governmental entity may be misusing its regulatory power
to obtain an unrelated benefit for which it should pay. Clearly the regulation should be struck down if that is in fact the case, but usually the question is a difficult one. The airport zoning cases provide a good example.
Airport zoning imposes severe height limitations for buildings and foliage
upon private property situated off the ends of runways. Some courts have
viewed this as the taking of an easement or servitude for use in operating
the airport and, accordingly, have invalidated it.97 Other courts, focusing
93. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
94. 274 U.S. 603 (1928).
95. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
96. See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
97. McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980); Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964). See Sax I, supra note 10 (relied on by the Minnesota
court in McShane).
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on the safety of passengers and crews, have sustained airport zoning as
a proper exercise of the police power."
Incidentally, this may have been the true rationale for the decision
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. With respect to streets, Justice Holmes noted
that the governmental entities had purchased the surface rights, and
stated that there was no reason why the right to support should be
obtained, without payment, at the expense of the owners of the mineral
estate.
Determining whether the regulation is appropriate may depend upon
how broadly or narrowly the problem is viewed. The California court recognized that development of the Nollan's lot, by itself, would not seriously
affect the public's access to the beach." But it did contribute to the
problem arising from the extensive development along the coast in that
area. Likewise, the easement across the Nollan's lot, by itself, would not
solve the problem, but it made sense as part of the overall plan to mitigate
the adverse consequences of the ongoing development. By way of contrast, Justice Scalia concentrated largely upon the undesirable consequences from construction of the Nollan's house, and the efficacy of the
easement across their lot as a means for mitigating them.
For this narrow or restricted analysis, Justice Scalia relied upon state
court decisions dealing mostly with local ordinances which require subdividers to dedicate land for public parks. There is an obvious similarity.
One line of cases, apparently beginning with an Illinois case, PioneerTrust
and Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect,0 holds that the requirement is
proper only if the particular sub-division, by itself, creates the need for
an additional park and, further, that the resulting park must be tailored
to that particular need. The other position, for which Associated Home
Builders v. Walnut Creek,"0 a California case, is the principal authority,
takes a broader view. It is only necessary that the need for additional park
land results from the overall growth of the community to which the subdivider contributes.
The box score for the state cases is probably not as one-sided as Justice
Scalia suggested by the somewhat cryptic statement, "Our conclusion on
this point is consistent with the approach taken by every other court that
has considered the question, with the exception of the California state
courts."'1 0 2 He failed to cite Coulter v. City of Rawlins'0 3 in which the
Wyoming court followed Walnut Creek and went a step further in upholding a provision requiring the payment of in lieu fees when the dedication
of park land would not be appropriate under the particular circumstances.
98. Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 1985), appealdismissed, 106
S. Ct. 1961 (1986); Kimberlin v. City of Topeka, 238 Kan. 299, 710 P.2d 682 (1985).
99. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 725, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986).
2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
100. 22 Ill.
101. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). In Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 725, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986), the California Appellate Court relied
upon Walnut Creek.
102. CaliforniaCoastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
103. 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983).
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The only limitation was that the money be used either for new parks or
to improve existing ones. In the Utah case cited by Justice Scalia, the
court stated the rule somewhat differently; "the dedication should have4
some reasonable relationship to the need created by the subdivision."'
For this, it relied upon Walnut Creek and a Missouri case, not cited by
Justice Scalia, Home Builders of GreaterKansas City v. City of Kansas
City. 10 There the court expressly rejected the rule of PioneerTrust as being
too restrictive. Relying upon both Walnut Creek and Village of Euclid,
the Missouri court stated: "The fact that a subdivision merely threatens
to 'contribute' to a community need for open space should not exempt
0
it from bearing a fair share of the burden of meeting the need.' '0
Obviously the decision in CaliforniaCoastalCommission casts doubts
upon Coulterand similar decisions. It also raises questions about various
types of regulatory programs being used to mitigate the undesirable consequences of a wide variety of developments. At best, local governments,
planners and attorneys will have to devote considerable effort to reviewing and revising their regulations. FirstEnglish Evan. Luth. Church makes
the review more urgent. The California legislature and Coastal Commishave to go back to the drawing board, and the task will not be
sion will
107
easy.

In considering the impact of California Coastal Commission, one
should not overlook Keystone. From one perspective, the two cases deal
with entirely different types of regulations. The statute in Keystone merely
limited the landowner's future use of his property, while the regulation
in CaliforniaCoastal Commission exacted a price for a permit to develop.
Viewed differently, however, the Pennsylvania statute took the coal that
it required to be left in place to protect the public interest in surface water
drainage and public water supplies, just as the Coastal Commission regulation took the easement to protect the public's right of access to the sea.
The park dedication cases have largely been decided by state courts under
the police power standards, and CaliforniaCoastalCommission is at least
consistent with that.
Four Justices dissented in California Coastal Commission, and it is
worth noting that the four dissenters in Keystone joined the majority in
California Coastal Commission.108
There are now, apparently, three distinct types of regulatory takings:
first, those that go too far;, second, those that do not substantially advance
104. Call v. West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Utah 1980).
105. 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977). Justice Scalia cited an earlier Missouri case, Noland
v. St. Louis County, 478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1972), which the Missouri court relied on in Home
Builders Ass'n, 555 S.W.2d at 834.
106. Home Builders Ass'n, 555 S.W.2d at 835.

107. See Justice Brennan's dissent on this and Justice Scalia's response. See also Justice

Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBendicitis, 107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987),

where he said, inconsidering whether the statute met the nuisance limitation he advocated,

"the legitimacy of this purpose is a question of federal, rather than state law, subject to
independent scrutiny by this Court." Keyston 107 S.Ct. at 1256 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
108. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. at 3142.
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the public interest; and finally those involving the misuse of the police
power to obtain an unrelated benefit. Damages for a temporary taking
are available for cases in the first category, but probably not for cases
in the second. Cases of the third type may present further difficulties.
If a subdivider complies with the regulation, dedicates the park land and
receives approval of his plat, he might well be estopped from then seeking compensation.
WHAT ABOUT ToMORROW

Whatever else, the historical review now completed demonstrates the
lasting potency of various words and phrases. These include "taking,"
"goes too far," "the average reciprocity of advantage," "investment
backed expectations," "inverse condemnation," "harm," "nuisance,"
"benefit," "burden" and now "heightened scrutiny." Prior to California
CoastalCommission and the Rehnquist dissents, the list might also have
included "judicial restraint," "deference to the legislative judgment," and
even "state sovereignty," meaning, of course, deference to the decisions
of state legislatures, local governing bodies, and state courts on questions
of primarily local concern. Ample authority for each of these can be found
in the earlier cases and also in more recent decisions by other federal
courts.' 9 The list should also be expanded to include something to the
effect that the public interest changes over time. Unfortunately neither
Justice McKenna in Hadacheck nor Justice Sutherland in Village of Euclid
managed to coin a memorable phrase.
Words and phrases aside, the cases as a group do not seem to provide
any very useful rules or principles. As suggested at the beginning, there
is a fundamental inconsistency or conflict in the opinions. Clearly, the early
zoning cases cannot be reconciled with Pennsylvania Coal Co. Nor can
Penn Centra4 Agins and Keystone be reconciled with CaliforniaCoastal
Commission. Some of the opinions are primarily concerned with the proper
role of government in the land use area. This involves the limits on the
police power historically based on the due process clause. Other opinions
are most concerned with the right of the landowner to use his property
as he sees fit. For this, the fifth amendment taking provision is arguably
relevant, although by no means necessary as the zoning cases demonstrate. In any event, it seems unlikely that the draftsman had regulatory
takings in mind when the amendment was proposed by Congress in 1789.
Expressly and by obvious implication, the taking provision states two
limitations. The government may only take private property for a public
109. In Meredith v. Talbot County, Md., 828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987), decided shortly
before California CoastalComm 'n, the court sustained the dismissal by the federal district
court of a taking claim based on the county's refusal to approve a subdivision plat. The court
relied upon the abstention doctrine under which federal courts are to abstain from deciding
cases involving complex state regulatory programs which provide for appropriate administrative determinations and adequate judicial review or, alternatively, raise difficult and unsettled questions of state law. The reason for abstention is to "avoid needless friction in federalstate relations over the administration of purely state affairs." Id at 232 (quoting Fralin
and Waldon, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974)). See also Hope Baptist Church v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 655 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
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use or purpose. Clearly it may not take property from one person for the
benefit of another. Second, when property is taken for use by the government, just compensation must be paid. These were the issues involved
in the early cases which made the taking without compensation restric"
tion applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. ' In the
much cited 1887 decision, Mugler v. State of Kansas,"' the Court stated
quite positively that the eminent domain limitations are not relevant in
cases involving the police power.
Clearly it is too late in the day to simply eliminate the concept of
regulatory takings, but until the recent decisions, one might reasonably
have concluded that the end result in a given case would be about the
same whether it was decided under the fifth amendment taking provision
or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court decisions, at that point, were more significant in framing the argument than determining the outcome. This, of course, has changed with
the new damage remedy provided by FirstEnglish Evan. Luth. Church,
however it may develop. Among the various words and phrases, "inverse
condemnation" has proven the most potent because it blurs the distinction between regulatory takings and cases involving physical invasions.
The two are basically different as noted by both Justice Brennan in Penn
Central"' and Justice Stevens in his dissent in FirstEnglish Evan Luth.
Church.
The long term consequences of California Coastal Commission are
more difficult to assess. The new standard of review, by itself, is probably of no great significance unless it results in greater activism by federal courts."1 The somewhat enigmatic reference to the state court decisions is of more immediate concern. The most disturbing aspect of the
opinion is the Court's apparent inability to understand and appreciate the
difficulties facing state and local governments as they attempt to deal
with new and politically sensitive problems in a period of limited budgets.
It is both too easy and unrealistic to say, as Justice Rehnquist suggested
in his dissent in Penn Centra4 that the payment of compensation is always
an available option. In the long run, the Rehnquist dissents might have
the greatest impact because they advance a much more draconian application of the taking without compensation provision.
There is a further difficulty. Some of the propositions stated in the
opinions appear to conflict with more or less well developed state law on
110. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Hairston v. Danville
& W. R. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908).
111. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
112. Penn CentroJ, 438 U.S. at 124. See discussion in text at notes 42 and 43.
113. See Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. at
3260. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1983), the Court apparently examined
the zoning map in determining that the zoning of particular property did not rationally serve
the purpose of the zoning plan. See however, Turner v. City of Atlanta, 257 Ga. 306, 357
S.E.2d 802 (19871 in which a dissenting judge, relying upon CaliforniaCoastalComm'n, would
have struck down the rezoning of plaintiff's property because the city failed to prove that
the regulation "substantially advanced the legitimate state interest." Turner, 357 S.E.2d
at 804.
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zoning and land use regulation based largely on the early zoning cases.
A hypothetical based upon the Teton County Comprehensive Plan and
Implementation Program (Plan), ' 4 should provide a fitting conclusion for
this discussion.
Under the Plan a development permit must be obtained from the
county commissioners for any development or change of use in the unincorporated areas of the county. In considering whether to grant the permit, the commissioners are required to consider the potential effects of
the development in a number of areas including air and water quality, utilities and other public facilities, fire safety, traffic, character of the immediate area, scenic resources and, finally, wildlife habitat, wildlife migration
routes and fisheries." 6
Now enters the developer who has paid a very sizable amount for a
tract along a ridge overlooking the Snake River with the Teton Mountains in the background. His plan is to construct a substantial number
of one and two bedroom condos along the ridge and sell time shares. This
should work because some people like to ski, some like to hunt, others
like to fish, and there are some who simply enjoy the fresh air and scenery.
Obviously the qualities that make the development financially viable are
the same as those which the Plan is designed to protect.
The developer, following the procedure mandated by the Plan, first
presents his development proposal to the county planner who is to evaluate it and forward it with his recommendation to the Planning Commission, an appointed body that serves in an advisory role to The Board of
County Commissioners which makes the final decision. The planner
immediately sees a problem. The tract is in an area that the state Game
and Fish Department has identified as a critical elk migration route.
At this point the planner is not much concerned with the question
of whether the permit might legally be denied. He knows that solution
would not be acceptable to the Board of Commissioners which is, after
all, an elected body. So negotiations begin. After consultation with the
Game and Fish Department, the planner offers to recommend a permit
to develop the south half on condition that developer grant the county
an open space easement precluding any development at all on the north
half. The developer feels the price is too steep, the planner refuses to go
further and the case is sent up to the Planning Commission which agrees
114. The Teton County Comprehensive Plan and Implementation Program, 1977, Fourth
Printing 1985 [hereinafter "The Plan"] was adopted by the county commissioners pursuant
to the county Planning and Zoning statute, Wyo. STAT. §§ 18-5-101 to -207 (1977 & Supp.
1987) and the county Real Estate Subdivisions statute, Wyo. STAT. §§ 18-5-301 to -315 (1977
& Supp. 1987). It was undoubtedly influenced by the work done in preparing a land use plan
mandated by the State Land Use Planning Act, WYo. STAT. § 9-8-301 (1977 & Supp. 1987).
The end result is a long and complex set of regulations with a good deal of overlap and some
apparent inconsistencies. I am indebted to Brad Mead, a former student, for a detailed analysis of the Plan prepared for a seminar on county land use regulations. Another student,
Howard Kushner, reviewed the Plan from a different perspective and entitled his paper, "Is
the Grand Teton a Non-Conforming Use?"
115. The Plan, supranote 114, at ch. VI, sec. 8. The section, in fact, provides for seventeen "required findings" including those paraphrased in the text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol23/iss2/7

26

Rudolph: Let's Hear It for Due Process - An Up to Date Primer on Regulator
1988

AN Up To DATE PRIMER ON REGULATORY TAKINGS

with the planner. When it goes to the Board of Commissioners they also
agree. Therefore, no permit unless the developer accepts the condition proposed by the planner.16 It should be added that, as required by the Plan,
public hearings were held by both the Commission and the Board.", A
substantial number of vocal citizens appeared and expressed a welter of
conflicting opinions.
The developer may now appeal the decision to the district court, and,
in view of FirstEnglish Evan Luth. Church, he will undoubtedly add a
11 8
new count seeking compensation for a temporary taking. What effect
speculative.
is
this will have on further settlement negotiations
Of the many possible alternative scenarios, one deserves mention.
When the case reaches the Board of Commissioners, they feel some sympathy for the developer because of his large investment, although they
basically agree with the planner. After checking the county's bank balance
and the budgeted expenses for the rest of the year, they conclude that
the county can afford to pay developer a reasonable amount for the open
space easement. So the case goes back to the planner for further negotiations, but again no agreement is reached. The planner, becoming desperate, asks the county attorney if the county can condemn the easement. He is willing to put the county's fate in the hands of a local jury
because the developer has come recently from California. However the
county attorney, after searching statutes, advises that eminent domain
is not available for this purpose. Once again, if both sides remain firm,
the developer will appeal the Commissioners' decision to the district
court.
Once it reaches the courts, the case will undoubtedly present a number of state law questions. The Wyoming case law has not developed very
far as yet, but the county can find a good deal of rather general support
from a number of recent cases."19
116. The hypothetical is quite similar on its facts to Meredith v. Talbot County, Md.,
828 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1987). In that case the county had approved a subdivision plan only
upon the condition that five lots totaling forty acres remain vacant and undeveloped. The
lots had been identified as critical habitat for endangered species under the Chesapeake Bay
Critical Area Protection Program enacted by the Maryland legislature. The court did not
reach the merits of the case. Id at 232.
117. The Plan, supra note 114, at ch. VI, §§ 5-7.
118. As an alternative, suit might be brought in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). Attorney fees might be recovered under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Such suit, however,
would present a further issue as to the adequacy of relief under state law. See Williamson
County Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). See also Corn v. City of
Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987).
119. Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717 (Wyo. 1987); Coulter v. City of
Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983); Schoeller v. Board of County Comn'rs, 568 P.2d 869
(Wyo. 1977); Snake River Ventures v. Board of County Comm'rs, 616 P.2d 744 (Wyo. 1980);

Board of County Comm'rs v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., 652 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1982).

In the last cited case, Justice Thomas began his opinion with the statement: "The troublesome problem to be resolved in this case is that of balancing a meaningful review by the
judicial branch of government with the prerogative of a board of county commissioners to
manage its own affairs." Teton County Youth, 652 P.2d at 401.
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Concern here is primarily with federal constitutional issues, and the
hypo suggests a number. First, does the regulation as applied satisfy the
requirement for an average reciprocity of advantage? Mostly it depends
upon how broadly the issue is viewed. Looking only at the particular
development, it can be argued that the developer is being required to bear
the entire cost of a public benefit for which the public should pay. On the
other hand, the success of the developer's plan may depend upon other
developers being similarly restricted, and reciprocity of advantage could
be found from that. But he has no assurance that this will be the result,
and it may turn out that he was unfairly discriminated against. Traditional zoning statutes seek to minimize problems of this sort by requiring that all properties within a given district be treated uniformly. 20 This
would seem to be the particular weakness of regulatory programs that
call for individualized decisions on specific property in accordance with
broad standards that leave room for a good deal of discretion. Is this in
accordance with a comprehensive plan? The requirement for a comprehensive plan is, of course, the cornerstone for traditional zoning and, as
Justice Rehnquist noted in Penn Central,provides the necessary average
reciprocity of advantage. 12 1 The county can find some support from Agins
and also Gorieb v. Fox, the 1927 case sustaining a zoning regulation
providing for the individual negotiation of set back lines. The procedure
is similar to the granting of special exceptions or conditional uses under
a typical zoning ordinance which also involves the application of very
general standards to a particular property and provides a good deal of
discretion.'22
Should the county's proposal be considered a misuse of its regulatory
authority to obtain a property interest for which it should pay? 23 This
is the most troublesome. By itself, this development might not seriously
impede the elk as they move from their summer range to the winter range.
There will still be plenty of open space left. It is only when the cumulative impact of all development is taken into account that the problem
becomes acute. The similarity to the park dedication cases is obvious. So
too are the disturbing implications of the opinion in California Coastal
Commission. Of what significance is it that the county may, at one point,
120. In SCIT, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 19 Mass. App. 101, 472 N.E.2d 269 (1984) the court
struck down a provision requiring a special permit for any development within a zoning district as violating the uniformity requirement.
121. See Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 I1. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (1981) in
which the court relied upon the comprehensive plan in sustaining the agricultural classification of land that the owner desired to subdivide.
122. See C & M Sand and Gravel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 673 P.2d 1013 (Colo.
App. 1983); Berk v. Wilkinsburg Zon. Hear. Bd., 48 Pa. Commn. 496, 410 A.2d 904 (1980).
123. Flood plain and wetland zoning which seeks to preserve property in its natural state,
thereby benefiting recreational users and wildlife, has met with mixed receptions. See Morris
County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d

232 (1963), which struck down such zoning as an uncompensated taking for a public purpose, and Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), and Turnpike
Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972), both sustaining such regulations because they protect public safety and prevent flooding and pollution. See also United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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have attempted to purchase the easement?"' On this, the county may
again take some comfort from Agins, in which the city had considered
condemnation before turning to regulation.
Finally, does the regulation as applied go too far? Like the previous
questions, this depends mostly upon how narrowly or broadly one views
the issue. From one perspective the answer is simple. The land has historically been used to graze cattle and that use may continue. There is no
reason to hold the county responsible because the tract purchased by the
developer is too small and the price paid too high for grazing to be economically viable.
The Rehnquist dissents in Penn Central and Keystone, for which there
is apparently increased support, might require an entirely different analysis. Considering only the north half of the tract, the question would be
the impact of the regulation upon its value as determined by reference
to the developer's plans for it and the price he paid.'2 5 On that basis the
developer seems a sure winner. That result, however, would be contrary
to much accepted zoning law, at least with respect to end results. The
development possibilities could be as severely limited by a density regulation such as the one approved by the Wyoming court in Snake River
Ventures v. Board of County Commissioners,126 which limited the number of residential units that could be constructed in a given area. Similarly, the number of units might be limited by establishing very large minimum lot sizes, the sort of zoning apparently involved in Agins. '
Finally, the Rehnquist analysis, if applied to these facts, would appear
to run contrary to one of the major purposes that the typical Planned Unit
Development ordinance is intended to serve-arranging the location of
buildings on a given tract to preserve as much open space as possible. 2 8
If need be, the park dedication cases can be distinguished. In those the
subdivider is required to convey the property to the public. In a planned
unit development, or PUD, the developer continues to own the open space
124. The New York Court of Appeals, in its opinion in Penn Centra 366 N.E.2d at 1278,
suggested that regulation and eminent domain were alternatives for the preservation of
historic landmarks, and that the choice might depend upon the financial condition of the
governmental entity. Id CompareBurrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590,432 A.2d 15 (1981).
See Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power v. Eminent Domain, III
LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 (1968).
125. Compare American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Matin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.
1981). The plaintiff owned two contiguous tracts which were zoned differently with respect

to density restrictions. The court was not able to decide if they were to be treated as two
tracts or one, under Penn Centra in judging the diminution in value, and remanded so plaintiff
could present a development plan.
126. 616 P.2d 744 (Wyo. 1980).
127. R. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at §§ 7.06 and 7.33, but see § 8.14 on the use of large

minimum lot sizes to exclude low and moderate income residents. The latter would not seem

relevant to Teton County. On density regulations that may go too far see American Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981).
128. See Friends of Shawangunks, Inc v. Knowlton, 64 N.Y.2d 387, 476 N.E.2d 988 (1985);
Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Cal. App. 3d 774, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88

(1970).
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and may exclude the public.' 9 He is simply limited in his use. A golf course
might be permissible. In our case the developer can lease the north half
back to the rancher for grazing.
As it happens, the Teton County Plan does make special provisions
for planned unit developments, and, our developer's proposal could
properly be considered a planned unit development.2 0 The provisions for
PUDs relate primarily to the general density limitations which, for purposes of the hypothetical, may be assumed to limit development in the
particular district to one dwelling unit for six acres.'3 ' As a planned unit
development, the same number of units can be constructed on a part of
the tract as permitted for the entire tract under the general density regulation, if the remainder is dedicated for open space. In addition, if fifty
percent of the tract is dedicated for open space, then the developer will
be entitled to a "density bonus" and may construct even more units. For
our particular developer, however, this is not very useful because the additional units would have to be constructed on the backside of the ridge,
away from the river and mountains, and would not bring as high a price
as those along the ridge. The density bonus would seem similar to the
transferable development rights in Penn Central. 132 If the end result is
deemed a taking of the north half, the density bonus would probably not
constitute just compensation. But it is relevant to the question of whether
the regulation goes too far.
The related question suggested by the phrase "investment backed
expectations," deserves further consideration. The ranch family that
homesteaded the property eventually sold it to the developer, thereby
realizing the long term appreciation in value that resulted from changes
in demand that could not have been foreseen when the property was
acquired. Simple equity suggests that it might make a difference whether
the developer purchased the land before or after the adoption of the Plan.
But traditional zoning law gives a different result. In the Snake River
Ventures'" case the Wyoming Supreme Court held that a developer was
bound by a change in density standards adopted while his permit application was pending. The court relied upon cases from a number of jurisdictions holding that a development will not qualify as a non-conforming
use until construction actually begins.'3 Merely purchasing the land for
129. See Kamhi v. Planning Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193 (1983).
130. The Plan, supra note 114, at ch. V.

131. Id, ch. II § 1. The Plan does divide the county into zoning districts with use restrictions, density limitations and performance standards. Superimposed upon these are
environmental protection districts which include areas subject to flooding or that present
problems because of hillside development or development along water courses. Finally every
development must be judged individually with respect to the required findings previously
noted. This might be challenged as overkill. See SCIT, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 19 Mass. App.
107, 472 N.E.2d 269 (1984) discussed in note 118.
132. See also American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir.
1981).
133. 616 P.2d 744 (Wyo. 1980).
134. R. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at §§ 6.20 and 6.21. For a recent example, see Cohn
Communities Inc. v. Clayton County, 257 Ga. 357, 359 S.E.2d 887 (1987). Note the reference in the dissent to investment backed expectations. Cohn, 359 S.E.2d at 890.
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the intended use is not sufficient. Put differently the purchaser does not
have a protected property interest in a proposed change in use.
The proper standard for judicial review, highlighted by California
CoastalCommission, is somewhat complicated under state law. In Board
of Commissioners v. Teton County Youth Services,'3 5the Wyoming court
held that commissioners act in a quasi-judicial capacity in considering an
application for a development permit, and must therefore follow contested
case procedures to develop a record sufficient for meaningful judicial
review. 3 6 The ultimate question was whether the commissioners, in denying the permit, followed the standards set forth in the Plan.'17 The scope
of review is obviously greater in such a case than one involving legislative action by a local governing body. This distinction would seem of
doubtful relevance when federal courts are considering actions by local
governing bodies, especially in cases where the action has been sustained
by the appropriate state court. At that point, the question is more one
of federalism than separation of powers.
Finally, some comfort can be taken from the fact that, at least at the
federal level, there is apparently no question that regulations to protect
scenic and wildlife values serve a proper public purpose. This is clearly
an area that has evolved and changed over time. In Welch v. Swasey, "
decided in 1909, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the Massachusetts court that state and local legislative bodies may not regulate
to preserve aesthetic values but only for the protection of public health
and safety. Yet the regulations sustained in both Penn Central andAgins
were directed exclusively to preserving aesthetic values, and on this there
appears to be no disagreement among members of the Court. Justice
Rehnquist, in his dissent in Penn Central recognized that the historic landmark could be preserved by eminent domain, and this too requires a public purpose. 139 State courts continue to have difficulty with the question,
in part because aesthetics are involved in diverse areas of regulation such
40
a historic preservation, billboards, scenic beauty, and architecture.
135. 652 P.2d 400 (Wyo. 1982).

136. See the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Wyo. STAT. § 16-3-107(o) and (p)
(1977 & Rev. 1982).
137. Two recent Colorado cases involving PUDs have followed the same analysis on a
somewhat different question. The general PUD ordinance must provide standards sufficiently
definite for the courts to review the subsequent action of the governing body in granting
or denying a permit for a particular project. The court stated that the governing body acted
in a judicial capacity in passing on applications for permits. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Co. v. City of Thornton, 647 P.2d 670 (Colo. 1982), and Beaver Meadows v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1985). Other courts have held such action to be
legislative when PUDs are established by floating zones which require an amendment of
the zoning map. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at §§ 11.15 and 11.17.
138. 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
139. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which is most cited for the proposition that eminent domain may be used to further aesthetic purposes. The public purpose
that can be served by eminent domain might, of course, be broader than can be justified
under the police power. R. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at § 7.14.
140. R. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at §§ 7.22-7.25. Compare Metromedia Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev 'd on othergrounds,
453 U.S. 490 (1981) with Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass.
1972).
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Frequently the preservation and enhancement of aesthetic values may
be justified as protecting either property values or the local economy.1'
The CaliforniaCoastalCommission decision remains troubling. There
too, only an easement was involved, and granting the easement would
apparently not have had a serious impact on the value of the property.
The regulation was in effect when the landowner purchased the lot and
a number of his neighbors had complied. But, if the right to exclude the
public is the principal attribute of ownership,"4 even California Coastal
Commission can be distinguished.
When the case reaches the Wyoming Supreme Court, the court would
be well advised to devote most of its attention to the state law questions
and not be overly concerned with the federal constitutional issues."' This
would seem entirely proper. As the United States Supreme Court itself
has noted, the cases have been decided largely on their particular facts
and have not established rules of general and unvarying application. Even
the standard for heightened scrutiny set forth in CaliforniaCoastalCommission is consistent with that. There is no reason why the Wyoming court
should stir the tea leaves in an effort to predict the outcome on the off
chance that the federal Supreme Court might decide to hear the case on
appeal. In addition, this approach will make it possible for the Wyoming
court to avoid the many problems presented by FirstEnglish Evan. Luth.
Church.
At last the discussion turns philosophic, but briefly." Is the early
bird entitled to all the worms? If our hypothetical developer is allowed
to proceed in accordance with his original proposal, he will presumably
have no difficulty in marketing the time shares. But if developments of
that sort continue unchecked, the market at some point will be adversely
affected. The ski areas will still be there, but there won't be as many elk
and the quality of the fishing will be much diminished by streamside
developments." ' It will still be possible to see the Teton Mountains, but
they will not be as impressive when viewed over an unbroken string of
141. The Teton County Plan recognized possible legal difficulties in regulating to protect scenic resources and therefore stated a general policy for acquiring scenic easements
by purchase. See the "Scenic Preservation Element" of the Plan, supra note 114, at xi-xii.
However, as noted in the text, the operative parts of the program provide for acquiring such
easements by dedication in duster developments and planned unit developments. In addition the provisions for development permits require a finding that the development will not
have "any significant adverse impact on the Country's scenic resources." Id at VI-7.
142. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
143. See Rodgers v. City of Cheyenne, 747 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1987) in which the court

declined to reconsider, on the basis of FYrst EnglishEvan Luth. Church and CaliforniaCoastal

Comm'n, its earlier decision sustaining airport zoning. Cheyenne Airport Bd.v. Rogers, 707
P.2d 717 (1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1961 (1986). A number of other state courts
have cited one or more of the 1987 U.S. Supreme Court decisions but decided the cases on
prior state law. Augustou v. King County, 49 Wash. App. 409, 743 P.2d 282 (1987); Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So. 2d 902 (Miss. 1987); Atlanta Bd.of Zoning Adj. v. Midtown
North, 247 Ga. 496, 360 S.E.2d 569 (1987).
144. This paragraph was inspired by a trip from Glenwood Springs, Colo.up the Roaring Fork River to Aspen with a detour to Snowmass. That area does not, of course, have
scenic and wildlife values comparable to Teton County.
145. See H. HoovER, FISHING FOR FUN AND TO WASH YOUR SOUL (1963.
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condos. Some of the purchasers from the developer will become disgruntled, but they will have difficulty in finding buyers and will be able to
unload their units only at a considerable loss. Lurking somewhere in the
maze there may be an issue of consumer protection.
If this worst case scenario should come to pass, it would probably not
be fair to lay the entire responsibility on Justice Holmes. When he wrote
the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. he obviously did not have Teton
County in mind, or even down hill skiing. But he is the one who said,
"... a page of history is worth a volume of logic.'"6

146. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner. 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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